Here's the scenario. Five pirates, call them A through E for simplicity, have each stolen 20 gold coins from a treasure chest and each hidden them in a place where only they can find them. The five have come together to divide up the loot. They agree to do it as follows. Each in turn (from A to E) will make a proposal as to how to divide up the gold. The proposal will be voted on by all the pirates. If a majority vote yes, the gold will be divided in that manner. But if there's not a majority saying yes, the pirate that proposed the scheme will be killed. His gold is presumed lost (because he hid it) and (obviously) he will not be allowed to vote in any later decisions. Your challenge is to determine how the gold will be divided up, assuming that all the pirates make the smartest division possible and vote in the smartest way possible. Remember that nobody wants to die, and so the worst thing a pirate can do is propose a scheme that gets voted down. Assume that a pirate will vote for a scheme only if voting for the scheme gives him more gold than voting it down and then adopting the next one. (If the two are equal, assume the pirate votes NO, just because pirates are mean and enjoy killing each other) So, how much will each pirate get?
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